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Detecting gender discrimination among children in the intra-household allocation of goods 
from household surveys has often proven to be difficult. This paper uses some of the 
commonly used techniques in this field to analyze education expenditures in India. Contrary 
to most previous research, I find evidence of discrimination against girls. Results at the all-
India level are robust to the statistical method and the education expenditure measure, while 
they are more sensitive to changes in the analysis at the state level. In general, girls 
experience gender discrimination especially from age 10 onwards, with almost universal 
disadvantage in the amount of education expenditures in the group of 15-19 year olds. 
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In a number of developing countries, girls have significantly worse education, health 
and nutrition outcomes than boys. One possible explanation of this discrepancy in child 
outcomes is gender discrimination in the intra-household allocation of resources: Parents may 
spend more on boys than on girls, both in monetary terms and in the time allocated to each 
child. Empirical as well as anecdotal evidence suggests that gender bias is considerable in 
some developing countries: Parents in India may wait longer before going to the hospital with 
their baby girl than they do with their baby boy, for example, leading to differences in health 
outcomes
1. Rose (2000) finds that women work less after the birth of a boy and thus spend 
more time with their children in households with at least one boy than in households with 
only girls. In consequence, studying the existence and extent of gender bias in intra-household 
allocation has potentially important policy implications in order to improve outcomes for 
girls. 
Unfortunately, most studies of gender discrimination in inputs such as consumption, 
health or education expenditures are hampered by the general unavailability of data. While 
there is enough data to study outcomes such as school enrollment or mortality, expenditure 
data is usually only available at the household level, rather than for each individual child. This 
makes it harder to analyze gender bias within households. Because of these data limitations, 
researchers have often used the Engel curve approach, which allows the use of household 
level data to try to get at gender bias within households. In the Engel curve approach, the 
household budget share of the good in question is regressed on log per-capita total 
expenditure, log household size, the shares of various age-sex groups and other relevant 
household characteristics. If there is gender bias in intra-household allocation, then the 
coefficient on the share of male members of a certain age group should be significantly 
different from the coefficient on the share of female members of the same age group. 
By now, the Engel curve has been used to analyze gender bias in the allocation of a 
number of goods and in a variety of different countries, but strong results have been rare even 
in places where anecdotal evidence and measures of outcome variables suggest widespread 
discrimination against girls. This has lead to the questioning of the Engel curve approach both 
in terms of the statistical method used as well as the substantive question of whether 
discrimination can be picked up from household expenditure data or is only detectable in 
                                                 
1 For this and other evidence on gender bias in developing countries see for example Asfaw, Klasen and 
Lamanna (2007), Klasen (1996), Messer (1997), Miller (1997), Sauerborn, Berman and Nougtara (1996) 3 
 
other outcomes such as mortality. In general, however, the gender bias puzzle remains as most 
suggested alternatives do not lead to very different results. 
Contrary to the mainstream literature, my analysis of gender discrimination in this 
paper leads to strong results, suggesting severe and widespread gender discrimination in intra-
household allocation at least for the older age groups. I look at education expenditures in 
India, using nationally representative survey data from 2005. Gender bias is very robust to 
different measures of education expenditures and the statistical method used at the all-India 
level where discrimination works through both the decision to spend money on a boy but not 
on a girl (the extensive margin) and the decision to spend less money on the girl than on the 
boy, conditional on spending positive amounts on both children (the intensive margin). At the 
state level, there is some heterogeneity in the importance of the two channels across states and 
across age groups, but most discrimination occurs at the intensive margin. Results are 
sensitive to the education expenditure measure used in a minority of states, and their number 
declines as the age of the children increases. Pro-male bias also increases with age and 
becomes almost universal at the intensive margin for 15-19 year olds. In general, girls 
experience gender discrimination in the allocation of education expenditures especially from 
age 10 onwards.  
These results suggest that the Engel curve approach is not generally failing to deliver 
results but may be sensitive to the level of analysis (country versus state level) and the 
specific measure of expenditure on a good when the analysis proceeds at the sub-national 
level. 
The analysis in the rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides some 
background about the related literature. Section 3 explains the empirical strategy and the used 
dataset. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Background Discussion 
 
Ideally, researchers want to measure gender discrimination at the individual level by 
comparing household expenditures on each child. Given that expenditure information is often 
only available as an aggregate figure at the household level, however, the Engel curve 
approach has been widely used. Extending the traditional Engel curve to include household 
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where b is the budget share of the analyzed good, x is total expenditure, n is the household 
size, nk is the number of people in the household that belong to age-sex class k, z consists of 
other socio-economic variables of interest, and ε is the error term (Deaton 1997). 
To get more information about the sharing rule that households use to allocate 
resources between its members without imposing structural assumptions on household 
behavior, the literature relies on the use of exclusive goods, for instance goods that are only 
consumed by adults in the household, as dependent variables. For these goods, we know that 
only certain household members consume them. In my analysis, I will make use of children 
goods by considering educational expenditures. In this case, household consumption is 
children’s consumption. If we further assume that additional household members act as 
negative income effects for these goods, but that there are no substitution effects, an 
additional person in the household has the same effect on the consumption of these goods as a 
reduction in income. The age-sex classes in the equation above then tell us the effect an 
additional member of a certain sex and age has on the consumption of the exclusive good. 
Theoretically, the use of adult and children goods should lead to equivalent 
conclusions about intra-household bias against specific household members. Empirically, 
however, children goods have the advantage that they are measuring expenditures on children 
more directly than adult goods like tobacco or alcohol. When using adult goods, the analysis 
picks up whether parents cut back more strongly on the consumption of these goods when 
they have a boy of a certain age group rather than a girl, rather than measuring directly 
whether household expenditures on goods only consumed by children go up more for the boy 
than for the girl. The assumption that additional household members act just as income shocks 
and do not cause substitution effects may therefore be more likely to hold for children goods 
than for the indirect measurement through adult goods, which could change for reasons 
completely unrelated to additional household expenditures on children.  
Equation (1) can be estimated empirically by using ordinary least squares on 
household level data. If there is gender bias in intra-household allocation, then the coefficient 
on the share of female household members should be significantly different from the 
coefficient on the share of male household members of the same age group. 
By now, the Engel curve approach has been tested on a number of countries like 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Cote d’Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri 
Lanka or Thailand, and a variety of datasets and dependent variables, including adult goods 
like tobacco or alcohol, or other items like food or education expenditures. Unfortunately, 5 
 
strong results have been rare. The typical analysis is not able to detect strong gender bias even 
in countries where other indicators show severe discrimination against girls
2. Individual level 
gender bias seems to somehow disappear at the household level. The case of education 
expenditures is not very different from the general picture: Subramanian and Deaton (1990) 
only find weak evidence of gender discrimination in rural Maharashtra for 10-14 year olds, 
but not for other age groups, while Lancaster, Maitra and Ray (2003) detect significant gender 
bias in their sample of rural Bihar and rural Maharashtra only for the age group of 10-16 year 
olds. Kingdon (2005) uses Indian survey data on 16 states but finds that the Engel curve 
approach does often not pick up existing individual level bias. 
This widespread empirical failure of the Engel curve approach has led to a questioning 
of the reliability of the method by Case and Deaton (2003), but also to attempts to save the 
approach by trying to find the underlying reasons of this pattern. Various possibilities have 
been advanced: One potential cause is the functional form imposed by the OLS regression, so 
a number of papers have sought to relax this restriction. Bhalotra and Attfield (1998), for 
instance, estimate semi-parametric Engel curves and test whether potential effects are washed 
out by too large age categories, but still find hardly any difference between the treatment of 
children. Gong et al. (2005) also use semi-parametric analysis for different goods and 
conclude that gender bias seems to occur more through higher mortality rates and lower 
school enrollment for girls than boys, rather than through the consumption of common goods. 
Another potential reason is the unreliability of household survey data. Gibson and 
Rozelle (2004) argue that the strong bias they find using the Engel curve approach for adult 
goods in Papua New Guinea might be driven by the large budget shares of these goods 
compared to other datasets, and the fact that their dataset was specifically designed for this 
analysis.  
A third suggested reason in the literature is that aggregation at the household level 
leads gender bias to disappear. Kingdon (2005) and Aslam and Kingdon (2008) focus on 
education expenditures and are able to compare individual level and household level data to 
test whether individual level bias washes out at the household level. They indeed find stronger 
evidence of gender discrimination at the individual level rather than at the household level. 
Both papers also argue in favor of using a hurdle model that takes account of the censoring of 
the data, which is especially important in the education expenditure case where a significant 
number of households do not spend any money on education. 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Ahmad and Murdoch 1993, Deaton 1989, Fuwa et al. 2006, Gibson 1997, Gibson and Rozelle 2004, 
Haddad and Reardon 1993, Himaz 2008, Lee 2008, Liu and Hsu 2004, Murdoch and Stern 1997, Subramaniam 
1996 6 
 
My approach in this paper is similar to Kingdon (2005) and Aslam and Kingdon 
(2008) insofar as I am also making use of education expenditure data and a hurdle model to 
take account of the censoring of the data. In contrast to these papers, however, I am able to 
look at the robustness of my results to changes in the measure of education expenditures by 
constructing two different variables, which show that especially in some states results are 
sensitive to the definition of education expenditures.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
In this paper I use the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) from 2005, which is 
a nationally representative dataset, including 41,554 households from 1,503 villages and 971 
urban neighborhood areas (Desai et al 2005). It includes both individual and household level 
responses on various topics such as education, employment, health, fertility, and gender 
relations. 
I limit the dataset to households with children aged 0 to 19, which leaves me with a 
final sample size of 32,263 households. In order to warrant the analysis of gender bias in 
education expenditures, which can be seen as inputs to achieve the output of school 
attainment, it makes sense to first ask whether we do see different levels of school attainment 
in the dataset. If there is no significant difference between the school performance of girls and 
boys, different expenditures by sex might actually be justifiable in order to achieve this result 
that we ultimately care about. If we find that girls have lower school attainment than boys, on 
the other hand, it then makes sense to analyze education expenditures, which might be the 
cause for the difference in output. 
In the dataset, all children in the household between 8 and 11 were asked to do a test 
which checked children’s performance in the areas of reading, writing and mathematics. For 
these variables, we can analyze whether there are significant differences between girls and 
boys. The results are reported in table 1. As we can see, there are strong gender differences in 
the test results in all three categories, with girls doing significantly worse than boys
3. 
This suggests that there seems to be some evidence for anti-girl discrimination in 
school attainment which warrants moving on to the question whether girls are also 
discriminated against in the intra-household allocation of education expenditures. 
 
The IHDS collects expenditure data on education in a disaggregated way and for both 
the household as a whole as well as for each individual child. This allows me to create two 
                                                 
3 These results are consistent with evidence on gender differences in the Indian education system as summarized 
by Kingdon (2007). 7 
 
measures of household expenditures that are similar, even if not completely equivalent to each 
other. We get the first measure, called education expenditure measure 1 from now on, by 
summing up all the reported household expenditures on school and private tuition fees, school 
books and other educational articles (for example newspaper, library charges, stationery, and 
internet charges) in the past year. We get the second measure, called education expenditure 
measure 2 from now on, by summing up all the reported expenditures on school fees, private 
tuition, school books, uniforms, transportation and other school materials for each child in the 
household in the past year. This gives us an alternative measure of household educational 
expenditures that has a broader definition than the first one but is applicable for the same 
households. Consistent with the broader definition of measure 2, school expenditures with the 
second measure have a slightly higher budget share on average than expenditures with the 
first measure as reported in table 2. The budget shares of education expenditures both are 
relatively small with less than 5%. 
Table 2 also presents summary statistics for other important household characteristics. 
As we can see, a bit over 70% of households with children aged 0-19 incur positive education 
expenditures, which means that censoring is important for this sample. The average household 
size is 5.8, and the sample has the expected composition by religion and caste. Over a fifth of 
the sample are households classified as living below the official Indian Planning 
Commission’s poverty line. About two thirds of households in the sample live in rural areas. 
 
A natural starting point for the empirical analysis is using the Engel curve approach to 
detect gender bias in intra-household allocation of education expenditures as in the previous 
literature, especially because more flexible functional forms in general do not lead to very 
different results. I therefore estimate (1) from above, using the budget share of education 
expenditures as dependent variable. The age categories included in the regression are 0-4, 5-9, 
10-14, 15-19, 20-55 and over 55. Females over 55 are taken as the reference group. As 
education expenditures are made for school going children, we expect the coefficients for 
both males and females of the age groups 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 to be positive, which means 
that holding household size constant, increasing the share of household members from one of 
these three age categories will increase the budget share of education expenditures. These are 
our main estimates of interest, as we want to test whether household education expenditures 
increase significantly less for a girl than for a boy of the same age.  
We should expect to find a negative coefficient for 0-4 year olds who are not yet 
attending school: Holding household size constant, an increase in the share of very young 8 
 
children should decrease household expenditure on education. The coefficients on the shares 
of the adults in the regression equation will depend on whether an additional adult will spend 
more on education than a female over 55 years old. Household variables included in the 
regression are religion and caste dummies, state fixed effects, an indicator variable for rural 
households and the highest education level for a male and a female in the household. We also 
estimate equation (1) for 16 big Indian states separately. 
As the above regression is estimated by using OLS, results are potentially biased if the 
regressors are not exogenous. This has sometimes been raised in the literature as a potential 
reason for the usual lack of empirical results with the Engel curve approach. Jensen (2002) for 
example argues that fertility behavior in response to son preference will be an important 
determinant of family size: If son preference is high, then parents may get more children than 
they otherwise would until they reach the desired number of sons. This will mean that on 
average girls will live in larger families than boys, which puts more strain on household 
resources. This may well mean that girls will tend to have worse outcomes than boys merely 
as a result of larger family size, rather than as a consequence of intra-household 
discrimination. A related cause of potential endogeneity of the household size would occur if 
parents choose the number of children based on their preferences for school expenditures, for 
example by having fewer children with higher education expenditures per child
4.  
As we are mainly interested in testing the equality of coefficients on the share of male 
and female household members of a certain age group, endogeneity will be particularly 
worrying if it affects the age-sex groups. Suppose for example that a preference for sons is 
positively correlated with education spending, which may for example be true for members of 
the usually relatively conservative middle classes. Then the error term, which includes son 
preference, will be positively correlated with the share of boys at any age, but also positively 
correlated with education expenditures, thereby leading to an upward bias of the coefficients 
for boys. Similarly, son preference will be negatively correlated with the share of daughters at 
any age, leading to a downward bias of the corresponding coefficients. As the test for gender 
discrimination involves testing the equality of the estimated coefficients for the same age 
group for boys and girls, the omitted variable bias will tend to overstate pro-male bias.  
If we believe Jensen (2002), however, it is not clear that this is necessarily the correct 
story to tell even in the presence of son preference. If parents continue to have children until 
they get the desired number of sons, then son preference may actually be positively correlated 
                                                 
4 See for example Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the quantity-quality tradeoff 
and its empirical importance 9 
 
with the share of girls, especially at older ages. As long as son preference is positively 
correlated with education expenditures, this would tend to bias the estimates on the share of 
girls of a particular age group upwards rather than downwards. Depending on the size of the 
bias relative to the upward bias of the male coefficients, this may either reduce the overstating 
of pro-male bias or may even lead to an understating of pro-male bias if the upward bias of 
the girl coefficients is large enough. This ambiguity of the bias of girl coefficients in the 
presence of son preference means that it is not clear whether our estimates of gender 
discrimination will tend to over- or understate true differentials in the treatment of girls and 
boys, even assuming that all households prefer sons over daughters. Furthermore, some 
households may not have a preference for the gender of their children or may even prefer 
girls.   
Systematic misreporting of education expenditures is another important concern. As 
long as errors in education expenditures are uncorrelated with the gender composition of the 
children in the household, misreporting will not bias the estimated coefficients. Suppose, 
however, that households with girls will tend to overreport education expenditures in order to 
conceal that they are spending little on education for girls. In this case, the estimated 
coefficients will tend to understate true gender discrimination within the household. 
One of the other big problems with using OLS to estimate the Engel curve is the fact 
that a significant number of households incur zero expenditure on education. Censoring is 
therefore an important concern, which will bias the OLS results. To account for the censoring 
of the data I will therefore follow Kingdon (2005) and use a hurdle model to analyse gender 
bias at the extensive and the intensive margin. The advantage of using a hurdle model is that, 
in contrast to the Tobit model, it does not assume that the same mechanism underlies the 
choice of whether to incur positive education expenditures or not, and the choice of how 
much to spend on education conditional on incurring positive spending. The hurdle model 
therefore proceeds in two steps (Wooldridge 2002). First, the decision of whether to spend 
money on education or not is modelled by estimating a probit model, with an indicator 
variable for a positive budget share of education expenditures as the dependent variable. The 
second step is to model the decision of how much to spend on education, conditional on 
having decided to spend any money at all. I do so by estimating a conditional OLS regression 
using the observations with positive budget shares, assuming that the budget share of 
education follows a log-normal distribution for positive budget shares. As graphs 1 and 2 
show in the appendix, this is not a terrible assumption for either measure of education 
expenditures.  10 
 
Given this setup, calculating the marginal effects of both the probit and the conditional 
OLS part is straightforward. The marginal effect of interest in the conditional OLS part is the 
change in expected budget share of education expenditures for the positive observations of 
this budget share for a change in variable x, which is given by the following equation: 
 














Table 3 presents the marginal effects for the OLS and hurdle model for the whole 
sample, using both education expenditure measures. As we can see, the signs of the 
coefficients for all child age groups go in the expected direction: Marginal effects for 5-19 
year old children are positive, whereas they are negative for 0-4 year olds. This means that 
holding household size constant, an additional school-aged child increases the budget share of 
education expenditures, whereas a young child will reduce education expenditures. Given that 
the average budget share of education expenditures for a household is a bit over 0.04, the 
magnitudes of the effects are quite large, especially for older children. With the exception of 
20-55 year old women, all coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. The 
negative signs of the coefficients for adult men suggest that men spend less on education than 
women. 
Table 3 also reports the test statistics for tests of the equality of the coefficients for 
males and females of the same age group, using F tests for the OLS and the probit model, and 
using a two mean sample comparison t-test for the conditional OLS model. The results 
suggest that there is severe discrimination against girls from age 10 onwards in all parts of the 
analysis. Gender bias for all age groups is particularly strong at the intensive margin, 
however. It is not quite clear how to interpret the result of a significant difference of boys and 
girls in the 0-4 year age group: Holding household size constant, household education 
expenditures decline less for a young girl than for a young boy
5.  
                                                 
5 We might think that this gives us a pro-girl bias, as household school fee expenditures are affected less for a 
baby girl than for a baby boy, which could mean that more likely money is spent on educational expenditures for 11 
 
Suggestive evidence of discrimination against girls is quite robust to changes in the 
measure of education expenditures. Coefficients for measure 2, which is the broader measure 
of school expenditures, tend to be higher than those for measure 1, which is intuitive. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the corresponding results for 16 big Indian states in a 
condensed form by age. Table 4 for example reports the difference of the coefficients for the 
share of 5-9 year old boys and girls, and the significance level of the F or t test for the equality 
of the two coefficients. As the difference was calculated by subtracting the female coefficient 
from the estimated male coefficient, positive numbers represent higher expenditure on boys, 
whereas negative numbers represent higher expenditure on girls. Tables 5 and 6 are 
constructed analogously. The actual estimated coefficients as well as the test statistics are 
reported in the appendix.  
As for the whole sample, there is little evidence for pro-male bias for 5-9 year olds in 
the OLS estimation and on the extensive margin as reported in table 4. Andhra Pradesh is the 
only state that displays robust anti-girl discrimination under changes of the dependent variable 
in the OLS regression. Karnataka and Rajasthan have suggested discrimination at the 
extensive margin in one of the two specifications, but not in the other, whereas Punjab and 
Tamil Nadu have non-robust pro-girl bias.  
Similar to the all-India level, a lot of discrimination seems to occur at the internal 
margin. With the exception of Maharashtra and Assam, the hypothesis of equal coefficients is 
rejected for all states at the 1% significance level and is robust to the two education 
expenditure measures used. In contrast to the aggregate level where the effect is anti-girl bias 
under both specifications, effects at the state level are more affected by the education 
expenditure measure. 10 out of 16 states display the same sign of the difference in both 
estimations. Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh 
show evidence of anti-girl bias, whereas in Assam, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh and 
Maharashtra there seems to be some evidence of favoring girls in education expenditures. For 
the remaining states, the estimated difference in the budget share of an increase in the share of 
boys and girls in this age group is positive with one measure of education expenditures, and 
negative with the other. This could be either due to bias in the estimators, especially where the 
difference between coefficients is small, or reflect different expenditure patterns for children 
in different states. Transportation, for example, is only included in measure 2, but not in 
                                                                                                                                                         
the small girl than for the small boy. Alternatively, this situation could indicate a pro-male bias: An additional 0-
4 year old boy makes it less likely that there is positive expenditure on school fees, but this might be because the 
household now saves money for the later education for the baby boy and is thus more likely to stop school fee 
expenditures on the other (older and possibly female) children in the household. 12 
 
measure 1. If school transportation is more costly for girls than for boys, then it is possible 
that we find significant pro-boy bias under measure 1 which does not include transportation, 
but do find suggested pro-girl bias with measure 2, i.e. the effect of transportation costs could 
dominate discrimination in other parts of education expenditure, for example in school fees. 
On the other hand, if parents spend more on parts included only in measure 2 just for boys, 
say by buying more expensive school uniforms, then the effect could go the other way, 
possibly turning a pro-girl bias into a pro-boy bias. 
For 10-14 year olds, the results are reported in table 5. While the all-India OLS 
regression suggested pro-male bias in this age group, Punjab is the only state to display a 
highly statistically significant bias under both specifications. A similar situation arises for the 
probit models, where only Rajasthan seems to have robust gender bias. Again, most of the 
action seems to occur at the intensive margin. In contrast to the 5-9 year olds, there are only 
two states who switch the sign of the estimated bias, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. 6 
states have a consistently non-positive sign, 7 states a consistently non-negative sign, and 
Uttar Pradesh’s difference in education expenditure effects in insignificant for both 
specifications.  
For 15-19 year olds, the results are reported in table 6. The patterns are qualitatively 
similar to the situation for 10-14 year olds in that most results again occur at the intensive 
margin rather than at the extensive margin or in the OLS regression. However, more states 
now display statistically highly significant differences in the Engel curve approach, and all of 
them are anti-girl biases. At the intensive margin, most states now have consistently non-
negative differences, the only exceptions being Haryana and West Bengal. Bihar is the only 
state to switch signs from one education expenditure measure to the other.  
Overall, these results display interesting patterns at the state level. Gender bias in 
general seems to be much stronger at the internal margin than at the external margin, i.e. 
across most states parents do not choose to spend positive amounts on their sons but not on 
their daughters, but rather discriminate in the amount spent on their children. At every age 
group, the sign of the gender bias is robust to the use of different education expenditure 
measures for the majority of states, and the number of states that experience a change in the 
sign of the bias from one specification to the other declines with the age of the children. 
Together with increased action at the extensive margin and in the Engel curve approach for 
older ages, this seems to suggest that anti-girl discrimination is more pervasive the older the 
child. This is qualitatively the same conclusion that was reached at the aggregate all-India 








The empirical analysis in my paper has shown evidence of gender discrimination in 
the intra-household allocation of education expenditures in India. The used nationally 
representative dataset allowed me to analyze gender bias both at the all-India level as well as 
at the state level. Similar to some of the previous literature on education expenditures, I used 
not only the Engel curve approach, but also a hurdle model to take account of the censoring of 
education expenditures. The richness of the dataset also allowed me to construct two different 
measures of household education expenditures which were used to test the robustness of the 
results.  
In contrast to a number of previous papers, I find that gender bias in intra-household 
allocation is generally stronger and more widespread. Anti-girl discrimination seems to 
increase with age and becomes almost universal at the intensive margin for 15-19 year olds. 
This finding is quite robust to the level of analysis (all-India versus state level) and the 
measure of education expenditure used. While I find strong results with the Engel curve 
approach at the all-India level, most effects at the state level are only visible when using the 
hurdle model, as most discrimination at the state level seems to work through the intensive 
margin channel: Parents often spend less on education-related goods and services for their 
daughters than for their sons, rather than spending positive amounts on sons and nothing on 
their daughters. Results in this paper also suggest that even for the same sample of 
households, gender discrimination may be sensitive to the definition of the expenditure of the 
good in question, especially if analysis proceeds at a relatively disaggregated level like the 
state level and for age groups where discrimination is not almost universal. 
One reason for these strong results in comparison to previous papers may lie in the 
quality of the data. The dataset used here collected detailed expenditure data on education-
related goods and services both at the household level and at the individual level, which may 
have increased the reliability of the data in comparison to other datasets which just ask for one 
lump-sum number of education expenditure in the previous year. Asking about school 
materials and other costs such as transportation and uniforms may have reminded household 
respondents of their expenditures on these items which are most likely infrequent purchases 
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Table 1: Gender bias in school performance and enrolment for children between 8-11 
 Girls  Boys  p-value  of  difference 
(two sided test) 
Reading 2.57 
(.02) 
N = 5832 
2.67 
(.02) 





N = 5800 
.71 
(.01) 





N = 5812 
1.64      
(.01) 





* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Reported are the means, with standard deviation in parenthesis; N is the number of observations 
All school performance tests were available in English, Hindi, or the official state languages. 
The reading level was scored as follows: 0 (cannot read), 1 (letter), 2 (word), 3 (paragraph), 4 (story). 
The writing level was scored as follows: 0 (cannot write), 1 (writes with two or fewer mistakes). The 
mathematics level was scored as follows: 0 (cannot), 1 (number), 2 (subtraction), 3 (division) 
 18 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
budget share education expenditure measure 1  .042 
   (.063) 
 
budget share education expenditure measure 2  .049 
   (.069) 
 
positive expenditure under measure 1  71.18 
 






Other Backward Castes (OBC)  39.40 
 
Scheduled Castes (SC)  20.55 
 
Scheduled Tribes (ST)  8.25 
 
other castes  26.3 
 
rural  65.52 
 
below the poverty line  22.23 
 
household size  5.8 
   (2.39) 
 






Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; for dummy variables, percentages are reported 
The used poverty line here is the official poverty line by the Indian Planning Commission for 2005, 
which is based on 1970s calculations of income needed to achieve minimal calorie consumption and 
has been adjusted by price indices. It varies by state and urban/rural areas.19 
 
Table 3 All-India results for variables of interest 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
    OLS  Probit Conditional  OLS  OLS  Probit Conditional  OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.039  -.299     -.092      -.038     -.326  -.099 
      (.006)***  (.036)*** (.000)***  (.006)*** (.035)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 5-9  .058  1.016  .017   .074  1.021  .033 
    (.006)*** (.036)*** (.000)*** (.006)  (.035)***  (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .092    1.054  .082      .118  1.077  .112 
    (.005)*** (.036)*** (.000)*** (.006)*** (.035)***  (.001)*** 
Share male 15-19  .103  .467  .134      .125  .399  .164 
    (.006)*** (.035)*** (.001)*** (.006)  (.034)***  (.001)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.027  -.233  -.019      -.037  -.275  -.032 
    (.006)*** (.035)*** (.000)*** (.006)*** (.034)***  (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  -.031   -.220  -.020      -.037  -.268  -.019 
    (.007)*** (.046)*** (.000)*** (.008)*** (.044)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.036   -.283   -.079      -0.35  -.281  -.091 
    (.006)*** (.036)*** (.000)*** (.006)  (.035)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 5-9  .049  1.001  .007      .064  1.003  .022 
    (.006)*** (.036)*** (.000)*** (.006)*** (.035)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .077     .940     .072     .104  .986  .102 
    (.005)*** (.036)*** (.000)*** (.006)*** (.036)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 15-19  .075   .300   .100     .098  .286  .128 
    (.005)*** (.034)*** (.000)*** (.006)*** (.033)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 20-55  .003  .033   -.017     .004  -.004  -.015 
    (.005) (.032) (.000)*** (.006)  (.031)  (.000)*** 
test statistic 0-4  0.41  0.33  -22.85*** 0.25  2.82*  -12.82*** 
test statistic 5-9  3.81*  0.26  110.91*** 4.97**  0.35  56.92*** 
test statistic 10-14  13.15***  13.70*** 18.80***  10.54*** 8.45***  13.68*** 
test statistic 15-19  45.38***  42.11*** 40.71***  38.10*** 20.74*** 36.56*** 
test statistic 20-55  28.39***  63.28*** -18.01***  46.61*** 71.44*** -7.39*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared    0.24 0.33 0.31  0.26  0.35 0.30 
Log likelihood    -13017.5       -12360.8    
N  32263 32263 22957  32263  32263 23221 
Note: test statistic gives F statistic for OLS and probit and t statistic for conditional OLS; significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 20 
 
Table 4: Difference of coefficient estimates for 5-9 year old boys and girls and significance 
level 
 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Andhra Pradesh  .032**  -.030  .032***  .052***  .012  .084*** 
Assam  -.008  .109 -.003*  -.002  .084 -.020*** 
Bihar  .003  .079 -.010***  -.015  .018 .009*** 
Gujarat  -.025  -.082 -.067***  -.014 -.117 -.065*** 
Haryana .011  -.053  .032***  .018  -.078  .053*** 
Himachal  Pradesh  .005  .007 -.013***  .017 -.203  -.003*** 
Karnataka  .023  .201**  .016***  .008 .053 -.021*** 
Kerala  -.012  .145 .001***  -.012  .194 -.004*** 
Maharashtra -.006  -.122  -.001 -.014  -.119  -.033*** 
Madhya  Pradesh  .024*  .091 .027***  .007 .091 .028*** 
Orissa .015  -.074  .008***  .022  -.050  .023*** 
Punjab .010  -.096  -.017***  .016  -.390*  .010*** 
Rajasthan  .013  .107 .034***  .024 .235**  .044*** 
Tamil Nadu  -.012  -.300**  -.007***  .012  -.178  .035*** 
Uttar Pradesh  .006  -.011  .010***  .013  -.005  .028*** 
West  Bengal  .002  .072 -.012***  .007 .049 .001*** 
India  .008*  .015 .010***  .010**  .018 .011*** 
Note: significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
Table 5: Difference of coefficient estimates for 10-14 year old boys and girls and significance 
level 
 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Andhra  Pradesh  .017  .123 -.005***  .008 -.116  -.003 
Assam -.005  -.211  -.004  .049***  -.173  .034*** 
Bihar  .022  .222 .057***  .019 .285 .051*** 
Gujarat  .011  .254*  -.001  .001 .024 -.026*** 
Haryana -.048**  .093  -.044***  -.042*  -.087  -.033*** 
Himachal Pradesh  -.021  -.426**  -.008**  .012***  -.146  .0143*** 
Karnataka  -.013  -.097  -.024***  .003 .112 -.009*** 
Kerala .019  -.090  .012***  .057*  .338  .0671*** 
Maharashtra  .016  .116 -.004***  .007 .150 -.007*** 
Madhya  Pradesh  .034***  .221* .049***  .022* .249**  .049*** 
Orissa  .010  .044 .011***  .020 -.082  .034*** 
Punjab .068***  -.054  .102***  .097***  .047  .112*** 
Rajasthan  .048***  .413*** .050***  .019  .371*** .020*** 
Tamil  Nadu .002  .002 .014***  -.002  .098 -.024*** 
Uttar  Pradesh  -.004  .091 .061  -.006  .071 .000 
West  Bengal  .022  .129 -.016***  .023 .105 -.023*** 
India  .015***  .115*** .010***  .014*** .091*** .010*** 




Table 6: Difference of coefficient estimates for 15-19 year old boys and girls and significance 
level 
 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Andhra Pradesh  .054***  .223**  .063***  .061***  .134  .098*** 
Assam -.004  .085  .014***  -.020  -.131  .008*** 
Bihar -.015  .455*  .007***  -.012  .580***  -.006** 
Gujarat  .033**  .289** .083***  .037*  .235** .075*** 
Haryana  -.024  .057 -.011***  -.014  .037 -.0126*** 
Himachal Pradesh  .081  .100  .084***  .084***  -.017  .101*** 
Karnataka  .033**  .265*** .020***  .045*** .113  .059*** 
Kerala .007  -.045  .017***  -.0201  .002  .001 
Maharashtra .035 .154*  .057***  .0476***  .035  .047*** 
Madhya  Pradesh  .039***  .146 .054***  .035***  .156 .074*** 
Orissa .031**  .146  .059***  -.008  -.016  .039*** 
Punjab  .028  .029 .020***  .046*  .013 .027*** 
Rajasthan  .019  .322*** .058***  .015  .388*** .054*** 
Tamil  Nadu .032  -.087  .041***  .031 .098 .031*** 
Uttar Pradesh  .028**  .167*  .038***  .044***  .132  .054*** 
West Bengal  .026  .1823*  -.023***  .022  .166*  -.016*** 
India  .028***  .167*** .036***  .028*** .113*** .036*** 
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State-specific results for the parameters of interest (same comments apply as for all-India results) 
Andhra Pradesh 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
    OLS  Probit Conditional  OLS  OLS  Probit Conditional  OLS 
Share  male  0-4  -.058 -.394 -.102  -.049 -.588 -.092 
    (.021)*** (.146)*** (.002)***  (.026)*  (.150)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 5-9  .042  1.069  .030  .080  .926   .086   
    (.021)**  (.156)*** (.001)***  (.025)*** (.160)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 10-14  .043  .929  .030  .082    .631   .096   
    (.021)**  (.153)*** (.001)***  (.025)*** (.154)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 15-19  .097  .253  .149  .134   .029    .260  
    (.021)*** (.146)*  (.003)***  (.026)*** (.150)  (.005)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.042  -.290  -.020  -.051   -.427   -.036    
    (.022)* (.152)* (.000)***  (.027)* (.156)***  (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  -.058  -.327  -.072  -.063   -.583     -.026   
    (.029)**  (.196)* (.000)***  (.035)* (.201)***  (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.058  -.345  -.102  -.056   -.545   -.100   
    (.021)***  (.147)** (.002)***  (.026)** (.151)***  (.002)*** 
Share female 5-9  .010  1.099  -.001  .028    .907    .002  
    (.021)  (.158)*** (.000)***  (.025)  (.160)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .026  .805  .035  .075    .747   .100  
    (.020)  (.146)*** (.001)***  (.024)*** (.153)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .043  .030  .087  .073    -.105   .162   
    (.020)**  (.141) (.002)***  (.025)***  (.145) (.003)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.011  -.021  -.024  -.002  -.090   -.022    
    (.019) (.131) (.001)***  (.023) (.135) (.000)*** 
test statistic 0-4  .00  .21  .00  0.15  0.15  2.84*** 
test statistic 5-9  4.62**  0.05  49.20***  8.23***  0.02  47.68*** 
test  statistic  10-14  1.37 0.99 -4.90***  0.20 0.88 -1.39 
test statistic 15-19  12.12***  4.86** 16.82***  10.43***  1.71  15.67*** 
test statistic 20-55  2.09  3.84**  5.40***  3.54*  5.73**  -16.17*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared    0.23 0.34 0.30  0.22 0.32 0.25 
Log likelihood    -714.6       -740.9    
N  1817 1805 1306  1817 1817 1246 24 
 
Assam 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit  Conditional  OLS
Share male 0-4  .004     -.008   -.007   .001    .052    -.159   
    (.034) (.388) (.000)***  (.042) (.378) (.005)*** 
Share male 5-9  .056   1.483  .034   .054  1.499  -.100   
    (.029)*  (.321)*** (.001)***  (.036)  (.312)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 10-14  .086    1.109  .080   .104  1.180  -.006  
    (.029)*** (.328)*** (.003)***  (.036)*** (.320)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 15-19  .070   .760  .095  .097   .727   .048 
    (.029)** (.327)** (.003)***  (.036)***  (.319)***  (.002)*** 
Share male 20-55  .035   .119   .048     .024   .056   -.050    
    (.031) (.347) (.002)***  (.038) (.338) (.002)*** 
Share male over 55  .073    .511  .114  .054    .129   -.015    
    (.038)*  (.417) (.004)***  (.046) (.405) (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  .030   .378   .037   .006  .367  -.142    
    (.032) (.354) (.001)***  (.039) (.346) (.005)*** 
Share female 5-9  .064    1.374  .038    .056   1.415  -.080 
    (.030)**  (.327)*** (.001)***  (.036)  (.320)*** (.003)*** 
Share female 10-14  .091   1.320  .084  .055  1.354  -.041    
    (.029)*** (.329)*** (.003)***  (.036)  (.320)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 15-19  .074   .675  .081  .117    .858   .040 
    (.029)** (.323)** (.003)***  (.036)***  (.314)***  (.001)*** 
Share female 20-55  .016    .357  .004  .024  .239    -.049   
    (.027) (.305) (.000)***  (.036) (.297) (.002)*** 
test statistic 0-4  1.17  2.05 -36.96***  0.02 1.39 -2.53** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.27 0.33 -1.94*  0.01 0.20 -4.92*** 
test statistic 10-14  0.10  1.26 -0.95  6.76***  0.88 25.81*** 
test  statistic  15-19  0.07 0.21 3.50***  0.95 0.50 4.11*** 
test  statistic  20-55  0.76 0.94 28.50*** 0.00 0.58 -0.43 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.25 0.23 0.31  0.24 0.25 0.38 
Log likelihood    -359.7       -352.9    
N  743 743 500  743 743 467 25 
 
Bihar 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit  Conditional OLS  OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.044  -.403    -.127   -.025   -.426   -.082   
    (.029)  (.230)* (.003)***  (.030)  (.219)* (.002)*** 
Share male 5-9  .035  .512  .005   .038   .484  .028 
   (.028)  (.225)***  (.000)***  (.029)  (.213)**  (.001)*** 
Share male 10-14  .055  .625    .069  .101    .822    .125 
    (.028)**  (.222)*** (.002)***  (.029)*** (.211)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 15-19  .049  .376    .050  .067  .450  .068 
    (.029)*  (.236)  (.001)***  (.030)** (.225)** (.002)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.009  -.472    -.021   -.047  -.519   -.058   
    (.029)  (.229)** (.001)***    (.030)  (.217)** (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  .008  -.383   .020  -.007   -.482   -.005  
    (.038) (.309) (.000)***  (.039) (.292)*  (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.029  -.508    -.022  -.023    -.493    -.023 
    (.029)  (.230)** (.001)***  (.030)  (.219)** (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .030  .432   .015  .053    .466  .049  
    (.028)  (.226)* (.000)***  (.029)* (.215)**  (.001)*** 
Share  female  10-14 .032 .403 .012    .082 .537 .074 
   (.028)  (.227)*  (.000)***  (.029)***  (.217)**  (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .064  -.079    .043  .080   -.130    .074   
    (.028)**  (.230) (.001)***  (.029)***  (.220) (.002)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.005  -.186    -.026  .007   -.198   .004  
    (.026) (.206) (.001)***  (.027)   (.195)  (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0,56 0.49 -30.23***  0.02 0.21 -27.88*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0,06 0.27 -23.49***  0.55 0.02 -14.82*** 
test statistic 10-14  1,5  2.13  30.17***  1.10  3.70*  14.07*** 
test statistic 15-19  0,5  6.40**  4.04***  0.31  11.21***  -2.50** 
test  statistic  20-55  0,02 1.95 5.88***  3.88**  2.62 -42.72*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0,28 0.27 0.30  0.31 0.32 0.26 
Log  likelihood    -511.2       -483.2    
N      1169 831  1169 1169 792 26 
 
Gujarat 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit  Conditional OLS  OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.032      -.285   -.062     -.025    -.330     -.077   
    (.024) (.188) (.001)***  (.027) (.165)**  (.002)*** 
Share male 5-9  .016   .845   -.026   .062   .966  .035  
    (.023)  (.180)*** (.001)***  (.026)**  (.162)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 10-14  .083   1.194  .083   .109   1.100  .136   
    (.022)*** (.176)*** (.002)***  (.025)*** (.162)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 15-19  .058    .446  .120  .108   .286   .197    
   (.023)**  (.178)**  (.003)***  (.026)***  (.158)*  (.004)*** 
Share male 20-55  .000   -.307  .050   -.032  -.418    .064   
   (.024)  (.189)  (.001)***   (.028)  (.165)**  (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  -.009   -.131    .046    .003  -.220   .119  
    (.033) (.255) (.000)***  (.037) (.225) (.002)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.033  -.370   -.032    -.025    -.403   .011  
      (.023)  (.185)** (.001)***  (.026)  (.162)** (.000)*** 
Share female 5-9  .041   .927   .041    .076   1.083  .010 
    (.024)*  (.182)*** (.001)***  (.027)*** (.168)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 10-14  .072    .940    .084    .109   1.077  .162 
    (.023)*** (.182)*** (.002)***  (.026)*** (.172)*** (.003)*** 
Share female 15-19  .025  .157   .036  .071    .051    .122  
    (.023) (.178) (.001)***  (.026)***  (.158) (.003)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.020    -.264    -.008     -.012    -.250      .005   
    (.021) (.166) (.000)***  (.024) (.145)*  (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.00 0.34 -18.54***  0.00 0.34 -54.36*** 
test  statistic  5-9  2.00 0.35 -59.84***  0.54 0.73 -29.31*** 
test  statistic  10-14  0.40 3.18*  -0.50  0.00 0.03 -5.98*** 
test statistic 15-19  3.96**  5.19**  28.97***  3.82*  4.65**  15.49*** 
test  statistic  20-55  0.72 0.06 50.06***  0.59 1.20 44.39*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.22 0.31 0.31  0.27 0.41 0.30 
Log likelihood    -748.5       -612.3    
N  1602 1602 925  1602 1602 885 27 
 
Haryana 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.045    -.420    -.086  -.038     -.371   -.072 
   (.032)  (.202)**  (.001)***  (.033)  (.177)**  (.001)*** 
Share male 5-9  .076   .774   .041  .092   .902  .070 
    (.029)*** (.191)*** (.001)***  (.030)*** (.174)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 10-14  .099     .907   .073  .126   1.055  .106 
    (.028)*** (.188)*** (.001)***  (.030)*** (.173)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 15-19  .088   .351   .108   .124  .408   .142   
    (.029)*** (.186)*  (.002)***  (.030)*** (.163)**  (.003)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.012     -.274   -.016    -.018   -.166   .013   
    (.030) (.194) (.000)***  (.032) (.171) (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  .044  -.168    .003   .016   .019    .005   
    (.040) (.263) (.000)***  (.042) (.236) (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.050   -.405   -.134    -.026   -.245  -.062   
   (.031)  (.199)**  (.002)***  (.033)   (.174)  (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .065   .827  .008    .074  .980   .017   
    (.030)** (.199)***  (.000)***  (.032)** (.179)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .146  .814     .116     .167    1.142  .140   
    (.029)*** (.195)*** (.002)***  (.030)*** (.182)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .112    .294   .119     .138   .370  .155   
    (.029)*** (.188)  (.002)***  (.030)*** (.166)**  (.003)*** 
Share female 20-55  .019    .083  -.037  .016     .197  -.028  
    (.027) (.171) (.001)***  (.029) (.151) (.001)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.03 0.01 17.74*** 0.17 0.79 -5.68*** 
test statistic 5-9  0.24  0.11 45.46*** 0.55 0.29 41.55*** 
test statistic 10-14  4.96**  0.36  -18.51***  3.43*  0.31  -10.66*** 
test  statistic  15-19  1.21 0.17 -4.06*** 0.38 0.09 -3.38*** 
test statistic 20-55  0.99  3.54* 29.54***  1.11  5.06**  74.36*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.22 0.26 0.27  0.26 0.37 0.25 
Log likelihood    -618.4       -502.6    
N  1393 1393 987  1393 1393 963 28 
 
Himachal Pradesh 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.090   -.124     -.167    -.095    -.165    -.164   
    (.040)**  (.154) (.003)***  (.043)**  (.145) (.003)*** 
Share male 5-9  .085   1.262  .027   .095   1.070  .018 
    (.038)**  (.175)*** (.000)***  (.041)**  (.154)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .119   .792   .127   .172   1.018  .132 
    (.038)*** (.164)*** (.002)***  (.040)*** (.179)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 15-19  .231   .739  .264  .249   .741    .259 
    (.039)*** (.153)*** (.005)***  (.041)*** (.145)*** (.005)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.029   -.012   -.006  -.020  -.046    -.026   
    (.039) (.148) (.000)***    (.041)  (.138) (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  -.018   .088  .030   -.020   .046  .004   
    .(047) (.187) (.001)***  (.051) (.173) (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.075    -.158    -.092    -.067    -.075    -.086   
    (.040)*  (.153) (.002)***  (.043) (.143) (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .080  1.256  .039   .078  1.273  .021   
    (.040)**  (.186)*** (.001)***  (.043)*  (.177)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .140  1.219  .135    .160    1.164  .118  
    (.037)*** (.203)*** (.003)***  (.040)*** (.196)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .150   .638   .180   .164   .758    .158 
    (.037)*** (.151)*** (.003)***  (.040)*** (.148)*** (.003)*** 
Share female 20-55  .017    .104     -.024     .014   .065    -.053 
    (.035) (.133) (.000)***  (.038) (.124) (.001)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.19 0.08 -21.37***  0.60 0.71 -24.13*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.02 0.00 -14.41***  0.21 1.33 -5.20*** 
test  statistic  10-14  0.47 4.04**  -2.19**  0.13 0.43 4.65*** 
test statistic 15-19  7.42***  0.70  14.09***  6.92***  0.02  19.07*** 
test  statistic  20-55  1.25 0.61 38.30*** 0.62 0.66 26.30*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.27 0.49 0.30  0.28 0.54 0.29 
Log likelihood    -275.6       -244.8    
N  1040 1040 817  1040 1040 806 29 
 
Karnataka 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.063     -.463  -.083    -.063     -.526    -.117 
    (.019)*** (.110)*** (.001)***  (.021)*** (.117)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 5-9  .054    1.144  -.022   .068   1.059  -.004 
    (.018)*** (.115)*** (.000)***  (.020)*** (.117)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .049   1.185  .021  .093   1.237  .057 
    (.018)*** (.112)*** (.000)***  (.019)*** (.117)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 15-19  .110   .570  .129  .138   .419  .198   
    (.018)*** (.103)*** (.002)***  (.019)*** (.108)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.043    -.226   -.030   -.048    -.317   -.052  
    (.018)** (.102)** (.000)***  (.019)** (.107)***  (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  -.037  -.145   -.059  -.039    -.209  -.054   
      (.022)  (.129) (.001)***  (.024) (.135) (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.063   -.515   -.085   -.056  -.479     -.101   
    (.019)*** (.111)*** (.001)***  (.020)*** (.116)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .031  .943   -.038   .061   1.006  .017 
    (.018)*  (.109)*** (.001)***  (.020)*** (.114)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .062   1.281  .045  .090   1.125  .066 
    (.018)*** (.118)*** (.001)***  (.019)*** (.117)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 15-19  .077  .305  .110  .093   .306    .139    
    (.017)*** (.103)*** (.002)***  (.019)*** (.108)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 20-55  .027   -.024     .007    .001  -.043   -.030 
    (.017) (.096) (.000)***  (.018) (.100) (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.00 0.30 12.8  0.16 0.23 -7.19*** 
test statistic 5-9  1.29  4.14**  24.67*** 0.24 0.28 -88.25*** 
test statistic 10-14  0.83  0.76 -32.56*** 0.03 1.08 -7.63*** 
test statistic 15-19  6.05**  12.13*** 7.93***  9.69***  2.06  17.69*** 
test statistic 20-55  16.14***  4.46**  -83.07***  6.80***  7.41***  -26.77*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.20 0.3857  0.25  0.20 0.36 0.22 
Log likelihood    -1139.8       -1221.6    
N  3008 3008 2084  3008 3008 1923 30 
 
Kerala 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.068    -.222   -.105     -.074    -.201    -.131 
    (.043) (.179) (.002)***  (.040)*  (.159) (.002)*** 
Share male 5-9  .0772    1.473  .016    .101   1.472  .028 
    (.037)**  (.160)*** (.000)***  (.034)*** (.143)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .134   1.479  .127    .211   2.235  .183   
    (.037)*** (.168)*** (.002)***  (.034)*** (.262)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 15-19  .178  1.136  .170  .205    .948  .220   
    (.036)*** (.155)*** (.003)***  (.033)*** (.138)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 20-55  .037    .073    .058  -.002   -.025   -.008  
    (.035) (.140) (.001)***  (.032) (.121) (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  .024   .086   .022    -.010    -.096  -.018   
    (.044) (.182) (.000)***  (.041) (.160) (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.047  -.036   -.059    -.049    -.101   -.077  
    (.044) (.179) (.001)***  (.040) (.155) (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .089   1.329  .016   .113   1.278  .033  
    (.040)**  (.169)*** (.000)***  (.036)*** (.145)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .115  1.568  .115   .154  1.897  .117  
    (.035)*** (.174)*** (.002)***  (.033)*** (.245)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .171   1.181  .153  .225   .946    .219   
    (.038)*** (.161)*** (.002)***  (.035)*** (.142)*** (.003)*** 
Share female 20-55  .014    .187  .001  .009   .065   .005 
    (.033) (.134) (.000)***  (.031) (.114) (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.27 1.27 -25.62***  0.46 0.54 -25.03*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.11 0.84 2.72***  0.14 1.72 -7.11*** 
test  statistic  10-14  0.34 0.23 4.69***  3.64*  0.98 21.68*** 
test  statistic  15-19  0.06 0.13 5.00***  0.56 0.00 0.13 
test  statistic  20-55  0.36 0.58 65.38*** 0.09 0.53 -97.31*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.17 0.39 0.16  0.23 0.52 0.22 
Log likelihood    -421.9       -319.7    
N  1152 1152 823  1152 1152 800 31 
 
Maharashtra 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.024     -.675   -.077  -.035     -.611    -.078   
      (.014)*  (.120)*** (.001)***  (.015)**  (.114)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 5-9  .020  .910  -.025    .021  .873   -.020    
    (.013)  (.117)*** (.000)***  (.015)  (.113)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .059   1.113  .037  .075     1.322  .057  
    (.013)*** (.119)*** (.001)***  (.014)*** (.122)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 15-19  .089    .509  .098   .104  .409   .117   
    (.013)*** (.111)*** (.002)***  (.015)*** (.106)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.025    -.369    -.018   -.042   -.376   -.032   
    (.013)*  (.111)*** (.000)***  (.015)*** (.105)*** (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  -.036   -.402   -.038  -.051   -.307   -.060   
    (.018)**  (.147)*** (.001)***  (.019)*** (.140)**  (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.015   -.399  -.052  -.023    -.348    -.068  
    (.014)  (.117)*** (.001)***  (.015)  (.112)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .026   1.031  -.025  .034  .992   .013   
    (.013)**  (.115)*** (.000)***  (.015)**  (.109)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .044   1.000  .041  .068   1.172  .063  
    (.013)*** (.120)*** (.001)***  (.014)*** (.122)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 15-19  .054   .355   .070   .056  .374   .070   
    (.013)*** (.113)*** (.001)***  (.014)*** (.109)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.008    -.080     -.016     -.015   -.057   -.025  
    (.013) (.104) (.000)***  (.014) (.099) (.000)*** 
test statistic 0-4  0.71  7.48***  -15.33***  0.84  7.74***  -6.60*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.31 1.40 -1.21  1.20 1.46 -93.92*** 
test  statistic  10-14  1.33 1.11 -3.74*** 0.44 1.48 -5.23*** 
test statistic 15-19  11.64***  3.29* 12.95***  17.79***  0.19  23.26*** 
test statistic 20-55  1.48  6.42**  -6.38***  3.04*  8.93***  -12.46*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.23 0.43 0.29  0.24 0.47 0.27 
Log likelihood    -915.7       -842.5    
N  2536 2536 1693  2536 2536 1641 32 
 
Madhya Pradesh 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.020    -.304    -.074   -.021   -.171    -.082 
    (.018) (.133)**  (.001)***    (.017)  (.131) (.001)*** 
Share male 5-9  .051   1.120  .011  .061   1.235  .032 
    (.018)*** (.130)*** (.000)***  (.016)*** (.129)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 10-14  .096    1.166  .070    .100  1.288  .079 
    (.018)*** (.133)*** (.001)***  (.017)*** (.131)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 15-19  .091   .391    .119    .095  .477  .122   
    (.018)*** (.131)*** (.002)***  (.017)*** (.129)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.026   -.133   -.051     -.022   -.015   -.064   
    (.019) (.137) (.001)***  (.018) (.135) (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  -.035   -.037   -.056   -.017   .130  -.075    
    (.025) (.177) (.001)***  (.023) (.175) (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.025   -.392   -.074  .025    -.311   -.087  
   (.018)  (.133)***  (.001)***  (.0174)  (.131)**  (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .027  1.030  -.016    .054   1.144  .004 
    (.018)  (.132)*** (.000)***  (.017)*** (.130)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .061   .946   .021  .078    1.039  .030   
    (.018)*** (.134)*** (.000)***  (.017)*** (.133)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 15-19  .052  .244  .065   .060   .321  .048   
    (.018)*** (.131)*  (.001)***  (.017)*** (.128)**  (.001)*** 
Share female 20-55  .019   .223  .005   .033  .240   .014   
   (.017)  (.119)*  (.000)***  (.017)**  (.117)**  (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.15 0.78 0.10  0.07 2.02 2.53** 
test statistic 5-9  3.33*  0.71  77.21*** 0.32 0.72 51.06*** 
test statistic 10-14  6.74***  3.59* 37.29***  3.07* 4.53**  34.24*** 
test statistic 15-19  7.51***  1.93 22.21*** 6.81***  2.28 33.32*** 
test statistic 20-55  5.15**  6.42** -60.83***  8.69***  3.48*  -70.50*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.21 0.36 0.30  0.22 0.37 0.28 
Log likelihood    -875.8       -861.0    
N  2306 2306 1656  2306 2306 1606 33 
 
Orissa 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.044   -.314   -.080   -.031   -.308    -.059    
    (.018)** (.138)** (.002)***  (.020)  (.144)** (.001)*** 
Share male 5-9  .056  1.226  .030  .078  1.249  .074  
    (.017)*** (.136)*** (.001)***  (.020)*** (.139)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 10-14  .081   1.046  .087  .121   1.037  .148 
    (.017)*** (.134)*** (.002)***  (.020)*** (.137)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 15-19  .068  .366    .114  .050  .222   .129  
    (.018)*** (.136)*** (.002)***  (.021)**  (.141)  (.002)*** 
Share male 20-55  .007   -.257   .043    -.004    -.210   .038 
    (.018) (.135)*  (.001)***  (.021) (.140) (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  -.027    -.288  .021   -.015   -.292    .035 
    (.022)  (.165)* (.000)***  (.025)  (.175)* (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.031     -.206   -.078   -.013    -.188    -.013   
    (.019)*  (.145) (.002)***  (.022) (.150) (.000)*** 
Share female 5-9  .041  1.301  .022      .055   1.299  .051   
    (.018)**  (.140)*** (.000)***  (.020)*** (.145)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 10-14  .071  1.002  .076     .101     1.119  .114 
    (.018)*** (.145)*** (.001)***  (.020)*** (.150)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .038   .220  .055    .058   .238   .089  
   (.017)**  (.135)  (.001)***  (.020)***  (.140)*  (.002)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.003    .147   -.046    .023    .016    .011    
    (.016) (.121) (.001)***  (.018) (.125) (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.75 0.93 -1.03  1.13 1.05 -41.66*** 
test  statistic  5-9  1.07 0.34 11.01*** 1.87 0.15 14.12*** 
test  statistic  10-14  0.48 0.12 4.95***  1.53 0.40 9.94*** 
test  statistic  15-19  4.74**  2.11 24.16*** 0.22 0.02 13.82*** 
test statistic 20-55  0.32  10.12*** 73.14***  1.75  2.99*  37.29*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.25 0.47 0.30  0.24 0.44 0.28 
Log likelihood    -531.3       -572.7    
N  1626 1626 1134  1626 1626 1078 34 
 
Punjab 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.043    -.408     -.048     -.043   -.384    -.071   
    (.034) (.191)**  (.001)***  (.036) (.156)**  (.001)*** 
Share male 5-9  .113   .781   .127    .146   .850  .113 
    (.034)*** (.195)*** (.002)***  (.036)*** (.173)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 10-14  .154   .506  .216     .224   .777   .228  
    (.033)*** (.189)*** (.003)***  (.035)*** (.172)*** (.004)*** 
Share male 15-19  .098   .118   .161     .156    .123   .170 
    (.032)*** (.180)  (.002)***  (.034)*** (.149)  (.003)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.057   -.397    -.022   -.068     -.350    -.073 
    (.034)*  (.185)** (.000)***  (.036)*  (.153)** (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  -.047   -.308   -.013    -.081    -.363    -.090 
   (.043)  (.241)  (.000)  (.046)*  (.197)*  (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.040  -.454     -.013    -.042    -.307    -.067 
    (.037) (.205)**  (.000)***  (.040) (.165)*  (.001)*** 
Share female 5-9  .103    .876  .144    .130  1.240  .103    
    (.035)*** (.205)*** (.002)***  (.038)*** (.197)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 10-14  .086   .560  .114   .126    .730   .115   
    (.032)*** (.188)*** (.002)***  (.034)*** (.168)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .070  .089    .142    .111   .110   .143    
   (.034)**  (.189)  (.002)***  (.036)***  (.157)  (.002)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.039    -.265    -.005    -.057    -.340    -.092  
   (.031)  (.171)  (.000)***  (.033)*  (.137)**  (.001)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.01 0.08 -45.49***  0.00 0.35 -2.17** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.12 0.25 -5.83*** 0.23 3.82*  4.08*** 
test statistic 10-14  7.20***  0.11 27.73***  13.01***  0.08 27.31*** 
test  statistic  15-19  1.24 0.04 6.01***  2.83*  0.01 7.52*** 
test  statistic  20-55  0.27 0.51 -50.64***  0.09 0.00 9.88*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.23 0.24 0.24  0.33 0.39 0.31 
Log  likelihood   -587.7       -422.7     
N  1323 1319 961  1323 1319 946 35 
 
Rajasthan 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit  Conditional OLS OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.053   -.239    -.121  -.066    -.222   -.119    
    (.024)**  (.155) (.002)***  (.026)**  (.149) (.002)*** 
Share male 5-9  .0350   .892   .022  .053    .955   -.017   
    (.022)  (.144)*** (.000)***  (.024)**  (.139)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .077   1.057  .072  .085    1.100  .028 
    (.022)*** (.148)*** (.001)***  (.024)*** (.143)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 15-19  .061   .424    .103  .062   .448     .056   
    (.022)*** (.144)*** (.002)***  (.024)*** (.139)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.064   -.293  -.093   -.082    -.312   -.147    
    (.024)*** (.155)*  (.002)***  (.026)*** (.149)**  (.002)*** 
Share male over 55  -.065    -.149   -.063   -.080   -.191   -.152 
    (.033)**  (.212) (.001)***  (.035)**  (.204) (.002)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.052    -.156    -.109  -.054   -.101   -.137  
    (.023)**  (.152) (.002)***  (.025)**  (.145) (.002)*** 
Share female 5-9  .022  .785    -.012  .029    .720   -.061  
    (.022)  (.144)*** (.000)***  (.024)  (.139)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 10-14  .030    .644   .021  .066     .729   .009 
    (.023)  (.152)*** (.000)***  (.025)*** (.148)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 15-19  .042      .102  .045    .047    .060    .002 
    (.022)*  (.145) (.001)***  (.024)*  (.140) (.000)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.029    .142   -.050  -.028   .023    -.106 
    (.021) (.138) (.001)***  (.023) (.132) (.002)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.00 0.49 -3.98***  0.38 1.18 6.39*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.62 0.87 76.86***  1.75 4.48**  44.77*** 
test statistic 10-14  7.47***  10.26***  38.18***  1.00  8.55***  42.62*** 
test statistic 15-19  1.14  8.26***  29.32***  0.63  12.97***  62.51*** 
test statistic 20-55  2.04  7.77***  -23.13***  4.22**  5.11**  -14.35*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.24 0.29 0.27  0.22 0.32 0.23 
Log likelihood    -829.7       -780.2    
N  1990 1990 1448  1990 1990 1408 36 
 
Tamil Nadu 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit  Conditional  OLS
Share male 0-4  -.038    .048   -.102    -.055     -.039   -.165 
    (.034) (.146) (.002)***  (.033) (.152) (.003)*** 
Share male 5-9  .057  1.108  -.010   .076  1.096  .012  
    (.031)*  (.146)*** (.000)***  (.031)**  (.151)*** (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .071   1.403  .049    .082   1.327  .034   
    (.031)**  (.161)*** (.001)***  (.031)*** (.164)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 15-19  .135   .493     .150     .138   .475   .136   
    (.033)*** (.143)*** (.003)***  (.032)*** (.148)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 20-55  .026   -.113    .062  .006    -.211   .049 
    (.034) (.144) (.001)***  (.033) (.149) (.001)*** 
Share male over 55  .002   -.223    .007  -.007    -.300    .009   
    (.043) (.185) (.000)***  (.042) (.189) (.000)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.034   .073  -.098  -.048    -.150    -.127 
    (.034) (.151) (.002)***  (.034) (.156) (.002)*** 
Share female 5-9  .068  1.404  -.002    .065   1.274  -.022 
    (.033)**  (.167)*** (.000)***  (.033)*  (.169)*** (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .060   1.401  .035  .084  1.229  .058 
    (.031)*  (.157)*** (.001)***  (.031)**  (.155)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 15-19  .103  .581    .110  .108  .475   .105 
    (.032)*** (.144)*** (.002)***  (.035)*** (.149)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.022   .037    -.032  -.025  .026   -.040   
    (.032) (.136) (.001)***  (.032) (.142) (.001)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.02 1.27 -1.57  0.05 0.96 -10.54*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.22 3.88**  -36.77***  0.22 1.41 79.35*** 
test  statistic  10-14  0.22 0.00 11.92*** 0.01 0.44 -20.75*** 
test  statistic  15-19  1.91 0.73 10.96*** 1.74 0.00 10.67*** 
test  statistic  20-55  1.95 1.17 67.55*** 0.83 1.69 82.28*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.18 0.42 0.24  0.19 0.40 0.22 
Log likelihood    -457.4       -474.7    
N  1367 1367 1005  1367 1367 971 37 
 
Uttar Pradesh 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
   OLS  Probit 
Conditional 
OLS  OLS Probit 
Conditional 
OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.023    -.093    -.041   -.000     -.136    -.022    
    (.018) (.120) (.001)***  (.020) (.117) (.000)*** 
Share male 5-9  .054  .929  .049  .080  .907  .085     
    (.017)*** (.116)*** (.001)***  (.019)*** (.114)*** (.001)*** 
Share male 10-14  .090   .912   .101  .106   .886    .135  
    (.017)*** (.119)*** (.002)***  (.019)*** (.118)*** (.002)*** 
Share male 15-19  .086   .403   .130    .135   .370    .180 
    (.018)*** (.121)*** (.002)***  (.020)*** (.119)*** (.003)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.042    -.212  -.026    -.041    -.264   -.021 
    (.019)** (.121)*  (.000)***  (.020)** (.119)** (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  -.039   -.098  .012  -.028    -.141   .031  
    (.025) (.166) (.000)***  (.028) (.163) (.001)*** 
Share female 0-4  -.017   -.001    -.039    -.005   -.020   -.027   
    (.018) (.118) (.001)***  (.020) (.116) (.000)*** 
Share female 5-9  .049  .940    .039  .067   .912    .057  
    (.017)*** (.118)*** (.001)***  (.019)*** (.116)*** (.001)*** 
Share female 10-14  .094   .820   .098  .112   .815    .134 
    (.017)*** (.121)*** (.002)***  (.019)*** (.119)*** (.002)*** 
Share female 15-19  .058  .236   .092     .091   .238  .126    
    (.018)*** (.116)**  (.001)***  (.019)*** (.115)**  (.002)*** 
Share female 20-55  -.008   .090    -.003    .007   .076    .006  
    (.016) (.105) (.000)***  (.018) (.102) (.000)*** 
test  statistic  0-4  0.20 1.36 -2.23**  0.11 1.21 7.76*** 
test  statistic  5-9  0.22 0.01 10.10*** 0.89 0.00 16.46*** 
test  statistic  10-14  0.09 0.87 0.97  0.22 0.53 0.06 
test statistic 15-19  4.33**  3.58*  15.15***  9.08***  2.33  14.75*** 
test statistic 20-55  4.03**  7.16***  -57.03***  6.25**  9.51***  -74.61*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared   0.31 0.33 0.33  0.29 0.34 0.33 
Log  likelihood    -1065.0       -1036.9    
N  2898 2898 2209  2898 2898 2182 38 
 
West Bengal 
      Measure 1        Measure 2    
    OLS  Probit Conditional  OLS  OLS  Probit Conditional  OLS 
Share male 0-4  -.048   -.191   -.241   -.025     -.109    -.223   
   (.025)*  (.142)  (.004)*** (.024)  (.143)  (.004)*** 
Share male 5-9  .049    1.089  -.034    .080  1.171  .006 
   (.024)**  (.147)***  (.001)*** (.023)*** (.147)***  (.000)*** 
Share male 10-14  .141   .907    .131   .170   .978   .175 
    (.024)*** (.144)*** (.002)*** (.024)*** (.145)***  (.003)*** 
Share male 15-19  .126   .312  .138   .153    .395    .183 
   (.024)***  (.139)**  (.003)*** (.024)*** (.139)***  (.003)*** 
Share male 20-55  -.020    -.288   -.012  .005   -.206      .020 
   (.024)  (.139)**  (.000)*** (.024)  (.140)  (.000)*** 
Share male over 55  -.065      -.509   -.037   -.032  -.388    .000 
   (.029)**  (.166)***  (.001)*** (.029)  (.167)**  (.015) 
Share female 0-4  -.052     -.314   -.216  -.031   -.240    -.201    
    (.025)** (.141)** (.004)*** (.025)  (.142)*  (.004)*** 
Share female 5-9  .047  1.017  -.021  .073  1.123  .005    
   (.024)*  (.153)***  (.000)*** (.024)*** (.154)***  (.000)*** 
Share female 10-14  .120   .778    .148  .147   .874  .198   
    (.024)*** (.144)*** (.003)*** (.024)*** (.145)***  (.004)*** 
Share female 15-19  .100    .130   .161    .131   .230   .198 
   (.023)***  (.132)  (.003)*** (.023)*** (.132)*  (.004)*** 
Share female 20-55  .031    .054   -.031    .064    .161   .013  
   (.023)  (.127)  (.001)*** (.023)*** (.128)  (.000)*** 
test statistic 0-4  0.04  1.30 -4.3***  0.09  1.44 -3.94*** 
test statistic 5-9  0.01  0.28 -16.66***  0.14  0.13 8.71*** 
test statistic 10-14  1.59  1.23 -4.51***  1.80  0.79 -4.59*** 
test statistic 15-19  2.33  3.50* -5.90***  1.62  2.81* -3.14*** 
test statistic 20-55  4.88**  6.90***  31.73*** 6.49**  7.75***  16.79*** 
R squared/pseudo 
Rsquared    0.32 0.36 0.40  0.32  0.34 0.39 
Log likelihood    -669.2       -683.3    
N  1804 1804 1327  1804  1804 1314 
 